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A large body of organizational research has studied gender inequality in the context 
of established organizations. Recent studies, however, have examined gender 
inequality in new ventures by looking at the antecedents and outcomes of female 
entrepreneurship. Yet entrepreneurship is rarely a solo endeavor, and with whom 
female entrepreneurs found new ventures is critical to their success. Thus, this paper 
presents founding team composition as a source of gender disparity in 
entrepreneurship. I examine how an institutional change that lowers barriers to 
entrepreneurship increases team-level homogeneity and unintentionally contributes 
to the gender disparity in entrepreneurial quality. I utilize a deregulation on the 
minimum required founding team size in the Korean legal industry. The findings 
suggest that homogeneity in founding teams increases after the deregulation because 
of sequential homophily in co-founder recruitment – entrepreneurs’ preference to 
first recruit more similar others and then reach out to less similar others. Furthermore, 
due to the strong field-level correlation between gender and human capital attributes 
in the Korean legal industry, founding team quality is particularly undermined for 
women than men after the deregulation. To support these claims, I analyze 586 law 
firms founded by 2,572 lawyers in Korea between 2005 and 2014. 
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A large body of organizational research on gender inequality has focused on the 
various roles of established organizations in generating different outcomes for men 
and women in terms of hiring, rewards, and career advancement (Baron, 1984; 
Castilla, 2008; Fernandez & Sosa, 2005; Kanter, 1993; Reskin, 1993; Rivera & 
Tilcsik, 2016). However, more studies have started to examine gender inequality in 
new ventures (Jennings & Brush, 2013) by looking at a firm’s origin (Phillips, 2005) 
and at the antecedents of female entrepreneurship such as social influence 
(Kacperczyk, 2013a), institutional foundations (Thebaud, 2015), and alternative 
opportunities inside a firm (Kacperczyk, 2013b). Other studies have also looked at 
the sources of gender differences in new venture success such as funding outcomes 
(Greenberg & Mollick, 2016; Guzman & Kacperczyk, 2016). 
Yet entrepreneurship is rarely a solo endeavor, and with whom female 
entrepreneurs found new ventures can have lasting consequences on their 
performance. Entrepreneurship research has long emphasized the significance of 
founding teams in firm success. For instance, firms whose founding teams have 
higher human capital are more likely to survive and grow (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, 
& Woo, 1994), and entrepreneurs’ social capital enables the new venture to receive 
financing (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Shane & Cable, 2002). Moreover, founding 
teams continue to have long lasting effects on the firm due to imprinting effects and 
path dependence in organizations. For instance, prior studies have shown founding 
team effects on subsequent organizational demography (Beckman & Burton, 2008), 
firm behavior (Beckman, 2006; Chatterji, 2009), and survival (Phillips, 2002). Such 
significance of founding teams on firm outcomes implies that an entrepreneur’s 
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choice of co-founders is critical to one’s success (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). 
This study presents the composition of founding teams as a crucial 
dimension of gender disparity in entrepreneurship. I examine how an institutional 
change that lowers entry barriers to entrepreneurship may result in an unintended 
increase in the gender gap in entrepreneurial quality. Specifically, I utilize a 
deregulation in the Korean legal services industry that lowered the minimum 
required number of founders of a law firm. First, I argue that demographic 
homogeneity in founding teams increases after the deregulation, because homophily 
in co-founder recruitment follows a sequential order in which founders first exhaust 
social ties to more similar others and then recruit less similar others. Second, I further 
suggest that, due to field-level demographic constraints in the Korean legal industry, 
the entrepreneurial quality of female founders is particularly undermined as 
compared to that of male founders. Given that women only recently started to enter 
the industry along with the large growth of the profession itself, there is a negative 
correlation between gender and human capital attributes such as elite education, 
judicial experience, and industry tenure. This inevitable correlation at the field-level, 
which aligns gender with major human capital attributes, suggests that increased 
homophily along these dimensions following the deregulation will constrain women 
entrepreneurs’ chances of recruiting co-founders with high-quality human capital. 
To support these claims, I analyze 586 law firms founded by 2,572 lawyers 
in Korea between 2005 and 2014. Consistent with the argument on sequential 
homophily, I find that founding teams are more homogeneous in terms of gender, 
prior educational affiliation, and industry tenure after the deregulation. I also briefly 
demonstrate an increase in the level of gender segregation across founding teams 
after the deregulation; Increased gender homogeneity within teams results in an 
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uneven distribution of men and women across founding teams. Furthermore, I 
compare changes in founding team quality for men and women before and after the 
deregulation. Results suggest that the average level of human capital of women’s co-
founders decreased more than that of men’s co-founders in terms of elite educational 
background and industry tenure. 
This study offers three contributions to organizational theory. First, while 
prior studies have largely focused on the conditions of female entrepreneurial entry 
or factors that inhibit female entrepreneurial success, I shed light on the recruitment 
of co-founders as a source of gender disparity in entrepreneurial quality. I propose 
two mechanisms that jointly disadvantage women entrepreneurs, namely individual-
level homophily and field-level constraints in founder demography. Second, I 
demonstrate that there is a sequential aspect of homophily by showing that 
demographic homogeneity in founding teams increases when the regulatory change 
relaxes the required number of co-founders to recruit. Third, I call attention to 
demographic constraints at the field level – the correlation between gender and 
human capital attributes – which inherently constrains the possible combinations of 
team demography. Along with these theoretical contributions, I conclude with an 
implication to public policy. The deregulation on founding team size intended to 
facilitate entrepreneurship, but it also led to gender disparity in founding team 
composition. Thus, both researchers and policymakers should pay close attention to 
how individual-level social processes and field-level structures may together cause 






2. THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Homophily in Founding Teams 
An inherent challenge in founding teams is the trade-off between similarity and 
diversity. According to Ruef et al. (2003), founding teams typically consist of 
members with similar characteristics such as gender, race, and occupation. This 
homophily principle in social networks (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) 
facilitates familiarity and trust among team members. On the other hand, founding 
teams have a need for diversity in order to incorporate diverse perspectives, non-
redundant social ties, and functional complementarity, all of which is likely to 
enhance a new venture’s chances of success. I argue that homophily is likely to be a 
priority over functional diversity for founding teams of new ventures. Since founding 
a new firm inherently entails risk, trust among founding members is crucial. Trust 
comes from familiarity (Gulati, 1995), as in preexisting social or economic ties, and 
the formation of such ties are often based on similarity (McPherson et al., 2001). 
Indeed, prior research has found that homophily is a strong mechanism of founding 
team composition (Ruef, 2010; Ruef et al., 2003) and that new ventures tend to be 
more homogeneous than established organizations (Chen & Rider, 2016). 
Homophily among co-founders is expected to be particularly evident in the 
empirical context of this study. This is because of the organizational form that most 
Korean law firms take. Two of the most distinct characteristics of this organizational 
form are 1) unanimous decision making, which requires all partner lawyers to agree 
on important issues of the law firm including addition of a partner, modification of 
the articles of incorporation, change of organizational form, merger, and dissolution 
and 2) unlimited liability, which burdens all partners with unlimited responsibility to 
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compensate for any damage involving a case handled by the law firm (Jung, 2010). 
First, unanimous decision making likely requires effective communication, 
cooperation, and trust. As suggested by social categorization theory, lawyers that 
categorize each other in the same social category would be more likely to perceive 
each other as more honest, trustworthy, and cooperative (Sorensen, 2004). Second, 
a potential liability occurred by any one lawyer is to be shared by all partners: another 
lawyer’s lack of capability can become my liability, which entails large financial and 
occupational risks (Shin, 2014). Studies on intergroup causal attribution argue that 
individuals tend to make internal attributions of success for ingroup members but of 
failure for outgroup members (Hewstone, 1990). Lawyers who are categorized into 
the outgroup by other lawyers in the firm would be especially subject to doubt or 
negative assessment of their capability as legal professionals. Thus, the two 
characteristics of the Korean law firm suggest that founding lawyers are likely to 
have a sense of “being in the same boat”, leading to a high level of homophily in 
recruiting co-founders. 
Although functional diversity within the firm may become more important 
as the firm grows and becomes more differentiated, I argue that at the founding stage 
of a new venture, the need for similarity and trust trumps the benefits of diversity. 
For law firm founders in particular, functional diversity among co-founders is likely 
to be a non-issue; while the aforementioned characteristics of Korean law firms 
ensure stable management of the firm and protection of clients, they are known to 
make it difficult for law firms to grow above a certain size, keeping them from 
pursuing specialization and economies of scale. Most recently established law firms 
work with individuals and small business clients rather than corporate clients. Since 
individuals and small businesses typically do not require complex tasks such as 
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M&As or project financing, there is limited differentiation within a firm in terms of 
legal practice area. Similarly, diversity in industry tenure is not as necessary because 
only complicated legal tasks require the leveraging of partner lawyers across 
multiple associate lawyers. Thus, although diverse information and knowledge are 
undeniably beneficial to any type of team or organization, founders of newly 
established law firms are more likely to prioritize a co-founder’s trustworthiness over 
functional complementarity. 
 
2.2. Sequential Homophily and Founding Team Homogeneity 
Based on the previous discussion on homophily among co-founders, this study 
argues that deregulation on founding team size is likely to increase the level of 
founding team homogeneity. When looking for others to found a new venture with, 
founders are likely to exhibit sequential homophily in their choice of co-founders. In 
other words, founders will first recruit others that they consider are closest and most 
trustworthy; then, as they recruit more and more members of the founding team, 
similar ties are exhausted and additional members will consist of more distant or 
dissimilar others. Consequently, larger teams are likely to be composed of fewer 
similar ties than smaller ones. 
Specifically, I hypothesize increased team homogeneity after the 
deregulation along four dimensions: gender, educational affiliation, industry 
background, and industry tenure. First of all, gender, as an ascribed characteristic 
that is socially salient, has been extensively studied as a dimension of homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001; Ruef et al., 2003). Second, regarding educational affiliation, 
Rider (2012) found that educational affiliation leads to more co-employment of 
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individuals in the same organization as well as organizational co-investments. Third, 
industry background pertains to founders’ previous occupation in the industry. 
Sharing the same occupation has been shown to induce homophily at a similar level 
of gender homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). Lastly, industry tenure homophily 
can be implied from prior research on the relationship between industry tenure 
similarity and organizational outcomes. Individuals with similar industry tenure have 
started out their careers in similar economic and industry situations and have 
experienced the same subsequent changes in the environment. In their study on 
increased demographic heterogeneity and organizational dissolution, Pennings & 
Wezel (2010) argued that organizational members with similar industry tenure will 
share common knowledge and mental models of the industry. Sorensen (1999) 
argued that similar tenure is linked to similar managerial capabilities, as managers 
who share past experiences will also share similar decision-making and cognitive 
frameworks. As individuals with similar industry tenure are likely to agree about the 
current industry environment and which strategies to employ, they will be more 
likely to become co-founders. 
Thus, I argue that homogeneity in founding teams will increase along these 
four dimensions after the deregulation that decreases the minimum required 
founding team size. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Founding teams are more homogeneous in terms of gender after the 
deregulation. 
Hypothesis 1b: Founding teams are more homogeneous in terms of educational 
affiliation after the deregulation. 
Hypothesis 1c:  Founding teams are more homogeneous in terms of industry 
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background after the deregulation. 
Hypothesis 1d: Founding teams are more homogeneous in terms of industry tenure 
after the deregulation. 
 
2.3. Field-level Constraint of Gender and Human Capital 
Attributes 
Field-level correlation between gender and human capital attributes is an important 
factor in considering founding team composition as it characterizes the pool of 
potential co-founders. Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily (2004) considered this 
correlation of demographic characteristics as a limitation of the demographic-based 
approach in designing effective teams. This is what they referred to as “multiform 
homogeneity” (Blau, 1977) – the extent to which demographic characteristics are 
correlated such that membership in one implies membership in another. When 
demographic characteristics are not orthogonal in an organization, managers have 
limited discretion in determining the composition of such characteristics when 
assigning teams. 
Likewise, founders in the Korean legal services industry may face a similar 
constraint due to the association between gender and human capital characteristics. 
Similar to many other countries, the recent influx of women lawyers in Korea 
coincided with the overall increase in lawyer supply. Because women only recently 
started to enter the Korean legal industry in substantial numbers, the pool of law firm 
founders exhibits an inevitable correlation between gender and major human capital 
attributes, including elite education, judicial experience, and industry tenure. First, 
there is an obvious negative correlation between female and industry tenure. 
Secondly, being female is negatively associated with elite education. Historically, 
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the extremely small quota for the passage of the judicial exam limited passers to be 
mostly from a small number of prestigious universities. Recently, however, the 
educational affiliation of lawyers has increasingly been diversified as the number of 
lawyers admitted to the bar each year has been increased. Third, being female is also 
negatively associated with prior judicial experience. While a disproportional number 
of women start their legal career as judges and prosecutors, female lawyers who are 
ex-judges and ex-prosecutors are very rare among law firm founders; judicial 
officers usually retire and become lawyers after 15~25 years on duty, meaning that 
the majority of women judicial officers are yet to reach this point of their career. 
 
2.4. Gender Disparity in Entrepreneurial Quality 
I conjecture that the field-level correlation between gender and major human capital 
attributes, along with increased gender homogeneity in founding teams, leads to 
increased disparity between the entrepreneurial quality of men and women founders 
after the deregulation on founding team size. If gender and other demographic 
characteristics were orthogonal in the pool of founders, increased homogeneity along 
any of these dimensions would not necessarily imply an increased gender gap in 
founding team quality. For example, if gender and elite educational background were 
not correlated in the pool of founders, increased gender homophily would not 
necessarily mean that male founders recruit more co-founders with elite education. 
However, if gender aligns with major human capital attributes, increased gender 
homophily implies a division of men and women along the important dimensions of 
law firm quality signals, such as elite education, prior judicial background and 
industry tenure. In other words, after the deregulation, the entrepreneurial quality of 
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female founders will be more undermined than that of male founders. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: After the deregulation, the number of one’s co-founders decreased 
more for women than men. 
Hypothesis 2b: After the deregulation, the proportion of one’s co-founders with elite 
educational background decreased more for women than men. 
Hypothesis 2c: After the deregulation, the proportion of one’s co-founders with prior 
judicial experience decreased more for women than men. 
Hypothesis 2d: After the deregulation, the average industry tenure of one’s co-
founders decreased more for women than men. 
 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Empirical Background 
3.1.1. Institutional Change in the Korean Legal Services Industry 
This study utilizes the context of the Korean legal services industry that has gone 
through major market-oriented institutional changes over the last few decades. 
Historically, the industry has been a “small, elitist, and closed market” that 
systematically only produces few elite judges and prosecutors through an extremely 
rigorous national judicial exam (Kim, 2006; Park, 2009). This system hindered 
market competition while protecting the prestigious socio-economic status of legal 
professionals. 
However, the reform first began in the 1990s by the Kim Young-Sam 
administration under the president’s belief in “law as a service”. This slogan 
represents the institutional change of the legal services industry from a traditionally 
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state-oriented monopolistic profession to a market-oriented competitive arena. 
While the historical supply of legal professionals has been very limited, the quota of 
persons passing the judicial examination each year was raised from 300 to 500 in 
1996, and then steadily increased to 1,000 by 2004 (Korean Bar Association, 2010). 
As a result, the number of lawyers has more than quadrupled over the last fifteen 
years. This increase intended to encourage market competition among lawyers to 
improve the quality of legal services and bring down prices. 
Recently, there has been an even further increase in lawyer supply through 
the adoption of American-style graduate-level law schools. Since 2012, the newly 
adopted law schools have produced almost 1,500 new legal professionals every year. 
With the introduction of law schools, the government is transforming the legal 
profession from a small group of social elites to a large pool of legal service 
providers from diverse backgrounds. 
 
3.1.2. Deregulation on Law Firm Founding Team Size 
The institutional change that this study focuses on is the deregulation on law firm 
founding teams. Article 45 (1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act regulates all law firms to 
meet a minimum requirement on the number of partner lawyers and their industry 
tenure, upon founding and later on. The minimum requirement has been relaxed 
several times throughout the past three decades (Figure 1). However, the most drastic 
change came with the last amendment on May 17, 2011 to absorb the large increase 
in the supply of lawyers. This change relaxed the minimum number of founding 
partner lawyers from five to three, and also the minimum industry tenure of at least 
one lawyer from ten to five years (Ministry of Justice, 2011).  The deregulation 
significantly lowered the barrier to entrepreneurship, aiming to facilitate the 
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establishment of new law firms and enhance market competition. While founding 
team requirements restrict the selection of founding partners by enforcing certain 
conditions, the deregulation gave potential entrepreneurs more freedom as to what 
type of and how many social ties to utilize in their recruitment of co-founders. 
 
FIGURE 1. Changes in Law Firm Founding Team Requirements 
 
3.1.3. Women Lawyers in Korea 
The recent increase of women in the Korean legal profession came with the overall 
increase in lawyer supply. Before the 1990s, entry of women was very limited. Dr. 
Lee Tai-Young, the first woman to pass the national judicial examination in 1951, 
remained as the one and only woman lawyer in the country until 1979 (Lee, 2009). 
Nowadays, women consist more than 15% of active lawyers and 40% of students 
admitted to law schools every year in Korea (Park et al., 2012). However, survey 
results suggest that discrimination against female lawyers still exists in law firms 
across multiple dimensions including hiring, promotion, and allocation of work (Yim, 
2012). Likewise, it is not surprising that currently there is no woman among the 
managing directors of top 15 domestic law firms (Shin, 2015). The lack of female 
partner lawyers in large law firms suggests the persistence of gender inequality in 
private practice. Perhaps much related to such challenges that women face in 
established law firms, there is sufficient evidence suggesting that large numbers of 
women are disproportionately entering the public sector as judges and prosecutors 
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(Park, 2013), preferring the more meritocratic and less discriminatory workplace. In 
relation to the current study, the difficulties that women face in established law firms 
imply the importance of women’s opportunities to found a new law firm of their own. 
 
3.2. Data 
To empirically examine my arguments, I collected data on the founders of Korean 
law firms founded between 2005 and 2014. The initial sample consisted of 744 law 
firms whose establishments were listed in the notice section of the journal Human 
Rights and Justice published by the Korean Bar Association. Since all law firms are 
required to register to the Korean Bar Association, I believe that this sampling frame 
is essentially the entire population of newly established law firms during the sample 
period. Data on individual lawyers was collected from Lawnb, a Korean online legal 
information provider owned by Thomson Reuters. Exclusions of observations 
missing data on key variables resulted in a final sample of 586 founding teams 
consisting of 2,572 founders. 
Before testing the hypotheses, I first examine gender differences in the 
human capital characteristics of law firm founders. Table 1 is a cross-tabulation of 
gender by each of the human capital attributes based on the sample of this study. 
Following Reagans et al. (2004), each cell in this table contains a frequency count 
and a standardized residual, assuming independence between gender and each 
human capital attribute. As can be seen, women are less likely than men to have an 
elite educational background or judicial background. Also, women are more likely 
to have industry tenure of less than 5 years, and less likely to have tenure of more 
than 10 years. On the other hand, men are significantly more likely to come from a 
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judicial background and have more than 10 years of tenure. The results show that 
men and women founders are significantly different with respect to these major 
human capital attributes. More specifically, being female is negatively correlated 
with major human capital attributes in the pool of law firm founders. 
 
TABLE 1. Educational Background, Industry Background, 
and Industry Tenure by Gender 
 











Female 51           173         12           212         136         53           35           224         
(-3.4) (2.6) (-6.5) (4.1) (8.1) (-0.1) (-6.6)
Male 890         1,458      719         1,629      654         565         1,129      2,348      
(1.1) (-0.8) (2.0) (-1.3) (-2.5) (0.0) (2.0)






*Values in cells are the frequencies in each category. Standardized residuals are in parentheses. 
Bolded characters indicate a standardized residual that is significant at the p < .10 level.
 
3.3. Measures 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
To measure founding team homogeneity based on each categorical variable, i.e., 
gender, educational affiliation, and industry background, I first construct the 







where * = 1,2,3, … , 0  denotes each category and $%  denotes the proportion of 
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team members in that category. There are only two categories for gender, i.e. male 
and female, and for industry background, i.e. former judicial officers and otherwise 
(0 = 2) . For university affiliation, 0  is the total number of universities that 
members of a team have graduated from. To account for the underlying composition 
of the pool of founders, I divide this HHI measure by the HHI of the total sample of 
founders in a given year, which results in the following measure for founding team 
homogeneity: 
 
23456758	:;<=	!3=38;5;7>? = !!"@ !!"A 
 
where !!"@  denotes the team-level homogeneity measure for team 7 and !!"A 
denotes the yearly homogeneity measure of the founder pool in year >. 
 For founding team homogeneity in terms of industry tenure, I follow 
Hambrick, Cho, & Chen (1996) and use the standard deviation of the number of 
years since a founder has first been licensed to practice law. To transform a 
heterogeneity measure into a homogeneity measure, I use the inverse of the standard 
deviation after adding 1 to allow for the standard deviation to be zero. I did not use 
the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) because 
team average industry tenure is included as a control variable. 
 To measure the entrepreneurial quality for each founder, I computed the 
average human capital characteristics of each founder’s co-founders (excluding 
oneself). For instance, the number of co-founders that a founder recruits is defined 
as founding team size minus one because this measure excludes the focal founder. 
The proportion of co-founders with elite educational background is the number of 
co-founders who graduated from Seoul National University divided by the total 
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number of co-founders. While it would be possible to create a continuous variable 
for educational prestige, the historical prominence of the law department of SNU 
along with the large number of founders from this university (36% of sample 
founders) suggests that graduation from this particular university is a marker of 
educational prestige. The proportion of co-founders with prior judicial experience is 
defined as the number of co-founders who are ex-judges or ex-prosecutors divided 
by the total number of co-founders. Average industry tenure is a straightforward 
mean industry tenure of founders in a team excluding the focal founder. To address 
the concern of auto-correlation between observations of founders in the same team, 
I use robust standard errors clustered by team in the regression model. 
 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
For the first set of hypotheses predicting founding team homogeneity, the main 
independent variable is the after deregulation dummy that equals one if a law firm 
is founded after the deregulation, i.e. on or after May 17, 2011, and zero otherwise. 
For the second set of hypotheses regarding the entrepreneurial quality of men and 
women founders, the independent variable of interest is the interaction term between 
after deregulation and female, which equals one if the focal founder is female, and 
zero if male. 
 
3.3.3. Control Variables 
I included control variables to account for founding team characteristics and founder 
characteristics. Team size is the number of founders. Location accounts for two 
aspects of a newly founded firm’s location: i) located in the capital city Seoul and ii) 
located in Seocho-gu, a prominent district in Seoul where “Seocho Legal Town” is 
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located. Approximately 30% of the nation’s lawyers practice in this industry cluster 
(Korean Bar Association, 2010) because the supreme and district courts and 
prosecutor's offices are located here. As practicing in this area entails a high level of 
local competition along with benefits of being in an industry cluster, founding teams 
who choose to open their firm in this distinctive location may be qualitatively 
different from those who decide to go elsewhere. Graduate education is based on 
the final educational level of a lawyer, where LL.M., Master’s, or Ph.D. degrees 
count as graduate level education. Prior big firm lawyer is based on prior 
employment at any of the top 13 law firms in Korea, whereas prior in-house counsel 
is based on prior employment at client environments including corporations, state-
owned enterprises, and government institutions. Prior solo practitioner accounts for 
prior experience working alone at one’s own law office as opposed to working at a 
law firm. For the first set of hypotheses, the control variables are the above variables 
at the founding team level, where the proportion or average is taken, while for the 




The first set of models predicts higher founding team homogeneity after the 
deregulation. Because the dependent variable is continuous, I estimated linear 
regression models using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. 
Specifically, I estimate the following equation, 
 




where !3=38;5;7>?@  is the founding team homogeneity of team 7 in terms of 
each demographic characteristic – gender, prior educational affiliation, prior industry 
background, and industry tenure – given the field-level founder homogeneity in the 
year of founding. GH>;I@ is a dummy variable set to one if the firm was founded 
after the deregulation, and zero otherwise. J@  is a vector of control variable 
covariates and K@ is the error term. C) is the coefficient of interest, and I expect 
C) > 0, indicating that team homogeneity is larger after the deregulation. 
 The second set of hypotheses predicts a larger decrease in entrepreneurial 
quality for women than for men after the deregulation. I estimated linear regression 
models using OLS with standard errors clustered by team. Here I examine how the 
gender disparity in founding team human capital characteristics differed in the 
periods before and after the deregulation. The equation is as follows: 
 
N5>I;$I;5;4I7<O	P4<O7>?Q
= RD + R) ∙ GH>;I@ + R& ∙ 2;=<O;Q + RS ∙ (GH>;I@ ∙ 2;=<O;Q)
+ RU ∙ V@ + RW ∙ XQ + YQ 
 
N5>I;$I;5;4I7<O	Z4<O7>?Q is the average human capital quality of the co-founders 
that focal founder [ has in the team, in terms of the number of co-founders, the 
proportion of co-founders with elite educational background, the proportion of co-
founders with prior judicial experience, and the average industry tenure of co-
founders. RS is the coefficient of particular interest. This estimates the change in 
the gender effect on the quality of one’s co-founders. Thus, I expect RS < 0 , 
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meaning that after the deregulation, women founders’ entrepreneurial quality was 
more undermined than men’s. The covariates V@ and XQ include controls for team 
7 and individual [, respectively, and YQ is the error term. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Founding Team Homogeneity 
First, I predict that founding team homogeneity increases after the deregulation. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations at the founding team level. 
The average team size is 4.97, reflecting the fact that most founding teams barely 
satisfied the minimum required team size. In fact, out of the 586 teams in the sample, 
approximately 74% of them only had the minimum required number of founders, 
both before and after the deregulation. The large number of teams with the minimum 
required size both before and after the deregulation lends support to the claim that 
founders tend to exhaust their close ties to fulfill the required number of co-founders. 
Table 3 reports the effects of deregulation on founding team homogeneity 
with regard to each of the four demographic attributes. The first model for each 
dependent variable contains control variables only, and the second model also 
includes the dummy variable indicating before or after the deregulation. Model 2 
shows that founding teams’ gender homogeneity is significantly higher after than 
before deregulation, lending support to Hypothesis 1a. Model 4 demonstrates that 
team homogeneity regarding educational affiliation significantly increases after the 
deregulation, and thus Hypothesis 1b is supported. Model 6 indicates that, contrary 
to Hypothesis 1c, team homogeneity in terms of industry background does not show 
an increase. In fact, the coefficient is negative, albeit not statistically significant even 
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at the 10% significance level. A possible explanation is that ex-judges or ex-
prosecutors who previously could not establish a law firm of five or more founders 
are able to do so after the deregulation, since they now only need two other co-
founders, most possibly lawyers with lower tenure and with no judicial experience. 
Model 8 indicates that industry tenure homogeneity is significantly higher after the 
deregulation, supporting Hypothesis 1d. In Models 1-8, the largest variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is 2.04, which is well below the 10.0 benchmark. This indicates that 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3. Regression Analysis Predicting Founding Team Homogeneity 
 
 OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Founding team homogeneity regarding each attribute 
 Gender Educational affiliation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After deregulation  0.07***  1.24*** 
  (0.02)  (0.12) 
Team size -0.00 0.00 -0.08*** -0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Location - Seoul -0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.24 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.17) 
Location - Seocho-gu 0.05* 0.04+ -0.14 -0.23 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.14) 
% Graduate 
education 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.23) (0.21) 
% Prior big firm 
lawyer 
-0.08 -0.10+ 1.49*** 1.18** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.41) (0.40) 
% Prior in-house 
counsel 
-0.01 -0.01 0.37 0.43 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.42) (0.38) 
% Prior solo 
practitioner 
0.11** 0.08* 0.79** 0.20 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.25) (0.24) 
% Prior judicial 
officer 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.50 -0.16 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.34) (0.32) 
% Elite education 0.01 0.02   
 (0.03) (0.03)   
Average industry 
tenure 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03+ 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
% Female   -0.10 -0.62* 
   (0.29) (0.29) 
Constant 0.98*** 0.94*** 2.74*** 2.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.20) 
Observations 586 586 586 586 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors. 




TABLE 3. (Continued.) 
 
 OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Founding team homogeneity regarding each attribute 
 Industry background Industry tenure 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
After deregulation  -0.01  0.70*** 
  (0.03)  (0.18) 
Team size 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Location - Seoul 0.12** 0.12** 0.40 0.39 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.24) (0.24) 
Location - Seocho-gu 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.21) (0.21) 
% Graduate 
education 
0.04 0.04 -0.20 -0.15 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.37) (0.36) 
% Prior big firm 
lawyer 
-0.23** -0.22** -0.26 -0.46 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.36) (0.36) 
% Prior in-house 
counsel 
0.03 0.03 0.52 0.54 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.64) (0.64) 
% Prior solo 
practitioner 
0.00 0.00 0.31 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.38) (0.41) 
% Prior judicial 
officer 
  -0.45 -0.27 
   (0.52) (0.52) 
% Elite education -0.09* -0.09* -0.16 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.31) (0.31) 
Average industry 
tenure 
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
% Female 0.01 0.01 -0.27 -0.56 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.58) (0.60) 
Constant 1.40*** 1.41*** 3.20*** 2.84*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.33) (0.31) 
Observations 586 586 586 586 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors. 





4.2. Gender Effect on Entrepreneurial Quality 
Second, I predict that entrepreneurial quality in terms of founding team human 
capital decreases more for women founders as compared to men. Table 4 shows the 
descriptive statistics at the individual founder level. Mean team size is much larger 
than in the previous analysis because large teams are accounted for multiple times, 
once for each individual-level observation. Among the 2,572 founders, 224 (8.7%) 
are female and 2,348 (91.3%) male. Considering that approximately 15~20% of 
active lawyers in the country are women in the study period, only a small number of 
female lawyers opt for law firm founding as a career option. 
 Tables 5-8 show the results of the regression analyses predicting the level 
of human capital of the focal founder’s group of co-founders. Across all models in 
Tables 5-8, the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.67, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in the analyses. While a better research design 
would match samples to ensure balance between founders before and after the 
deregulation, it would cause a reduction in sample size and also statistical power. 
Thus, in this study I report results on the sample without matching. 
First of all, in Tables 6 and 7, the significantly negative coefficient of after 
deregulation indicates that overall, co-founders’ elite educational background and 
judicial experience declined after the deregulation. Interestingly, as seen in Tables 6-
8, female founders have co-founders that on average have significantly more elite 
education, judicial experience, and industry tenure. This result is not that surprising 
when considering the nuanced context of law firm founding in Korea. Given the 
field-level correlation that was previously discussed, women lawyers are more likely 
than men to have less elite education, lower tenure, and no judicial experience. 
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Because of this tendency, male lawyers with very high tenure often recruit such 
female lawyers as subordinate members of the founding team. Few women lawyers 
who do have elite educational backgrounds, on the other hand, may be less likely to 
be recruited by men from elite backgrounds due to lower perceived commitment to 
their career (Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016). Thus, on average, female lawyers would have 
co-founders with higher levels of human capital quality than male lawyers. 
In the meanwhile, such recruitments of women lawyers as subordinates to 
high tenured male lawyers, who are likely to also be formal judicial officers, also has 
an implication to sequential homophily. Lower tenured women lawyers with no 
judicial experience are the most dissimilar co-founders that higher tenured men with 
judicial experience can find. Also, to such male founders, the characteristics of these 
female co-founders are not much different from associate level lawyers, who can be 
hired later on without having to include as a founding member. Therefore, the 
positive and significant coefficient of female may derive from the fact that female 
lawyers are among the last members to be recruited into the team to satisfy the 
regulatory requirement on team size. Thus, after the deregulation, these marginal 
recruitments of women will be less likely to happen – in other words, female lawyers 
would no longer be recruited as the fourth or fifth member. 
 This effect is actually shown in the coefficient of interest, that is, the 
interaction effect between after deregulation and female. This coefficient estimates 
the change in the gender gap of entrepreneurial quality. I expect that the coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant, indicating that after the deregulation, women 
lawyers’ ability to recruit co-founders with high-quality human capital decreased 
more than men lawyers’. Hypotheses 2a-2d are tested in Model 3 in Tables 5-8, 
respectively. In Table 5, the coefficient of the interaction effect is positive yet not 
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significant, suggesting that the decrease in the number of co-founders did not differ 
significantly between men and women entrepreneurs. Thus, Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported. Table 6 shows that the proportion of co-founders with elite educational 
background has decreased further for female founders than male founders at the 1% 
significance level, supporting Hypothesis 2b. As seen in the previous set of analyses, 
founding teams are more homogeneous regarding educational affiliation after the 
deregulation. Given the high field-level correlation between female and non-elite 
educational background, we can interpret the result of Model 3 in Table 6 that 
increased homophily between founders who graduated from the same university led 
to greater segregation along the lines of both gender and educational background, 
resulting in a larger decrease in average elite education of co-founders for women 
than men. In Table 7, Hypothesis 2c was not supported since the coefficient of the 
interaction effect was statistically not significant although in the expected direction. 
This is in line with the previous result in Model 6 of Table 3, where industry 
background homogeneity did not increase after the deregulation. Lastly, Model 3 in 
Table 8 shows a negative and marginally significant interaction effect between 
female and after deregulation, providing support to Hypothesis 2d. In other words, 
while average co-founder industry tenure decreased for both men and women after 
the deregulation, this decline was bigger for female founders. 
 Additional examinations of control variables in Tables 5-8 suggest that 
there indeed is homophily present among co-founders. For example, in Table 6, a 
founder is likely to recruit more others with elite education when the focal founder 
him/herself is from an elite educational background. Likewise, in Tables 7-8, the 
focal founder’s prior judicial experience and industry tenure is positively related to 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 5. Regression Analysis Predicting Number of Co-founders 
 
OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: No. of co-founders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Location - Seoul 7.64*** 7.45*** 7.44*** 
 (2.29) (2.17) (2.17) 
Location - Seocho-gu -7.40** -6.80** -6.79** 
 (2.75) (2.53) (2.53) 
Elite education 0.04 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.66) (0.71) (0.71) 
Graduate education -0.10 -0.23 -0.22 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) 
Prior judicial officer 0.67 0.43 0.42 
 (0.91) (0.87) (0.87) 
Prior big firm lawyer 15.78* 15.69* 15.69* 
 (7.33) (7.12) (7.12) 
Prior in-house counsel -1.36+ -1.31+ -1.29+ 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.75) 
Prior solo practitioner -1.27** -0.43 -0.44 
 (0.43) (0.46) (0.46) 
Industry tenure 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female -0.29 0.21 -0.30 
 (0.50) (0.47) (0.87) 
After deregulation  -3.92** -4.01** 
  (1.38) (1.44) 
Female X After deregulation   1.04 
   (1.23) 
Constant 1.17+ 2.50** 2.54** 
 (0.66) (0.78) (0.79) 
Observations 2572 2572 2572 
R2 0.38 0.40 0.40 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by team. 






TABLE 6. Regression Analysis Predicting 
Co-founders' Elite Educational Background 
 
OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: % Co-founders with elite educational background 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Team size 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Location - Seoul 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Location - Seocho-gu -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Elite education 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Graduate education -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior judicial officer 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior big firm lawyer 0.06 0.07+ 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior in-house counsel 0.05* 0.05* 0.04+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior solo practitioner -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry tenure -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.03 0.04+ 0.10** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
After deregulation  -0.06** -0.05* 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Female X After deregulation   -0.12** 
   (0.05) 
Constant 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 2572 2572 2572 
R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by team. 




TABLE 7. Regression Analysis Predicting 
Co-founders' Prior Judicial Experience 
 
OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: % Co-founders with prior judicial experience 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Team size 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Location - Seoul -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Location - Seocho-gu 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Elite education 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Graduate education -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior judicial officer 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior big firm lawyer -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior in-house counsel 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior solo practitioner 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry tenure 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.04+ 0.04* 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
After deregulation  -0.05* -0.04* 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Female X After deregulation   -0.05 
   (0.04) 
Constant 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 2572 2572 2572 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by team. 






TABLE 8. Regression Analysis Predicting Co-founders' Industry Tenure 
 
OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Co-founders’ average industry tenure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Team size 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Location - Seoul -0.27 -0.26 -0.25 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
Location - Seocho-gu 0.35 0.39 0.38 
 (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) 
Elite education 0.09 0.06 0.06 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Graduate education -0.19 -0.20 -0.22 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Prior judicial officer 0.27 0.24 0.24 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Prior big firm lawyer -0.47 -0.41 -0.42 
 (1.22) (1.23) (1.22) 
Prior in-house counsel 0.68 0.68 0.64 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
Prior solo practitioner -0.07 0.03 0.04 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Industry tenure 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.77+ 0.83+ 1.65** 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.60) 
After deregulation  -0.47 -0.31 
  (0.54) (0.56) 
Female X After deregulation   -1.67+ 
   (0.93) 
Constant 8.17*** 8.34*** 8.28*** 
 (0.55) (0.61) (0.61) 
Observations 2572 2572 2572 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by team. 







4.3. Additional Analysis on Field-Level Gender Segregation 
In addition to testing the hypotheses, I demonstrate that field-level gender 
segregation increases after the deregulation on minimum founding team size. If 
sequential homophily increases gender homogeneity in founding teams following 
the deregulation, the aggregate result would be that men and women founders are 
more unevenly distributed across founding teams after the deregulation. In other 
words, because of increased gender homophily between co-founders, men and 
women founders will be more likely to be channeled into different founding teams. 
Prior research has studied the determinants and consequences of gender 
segregation across occupations, organizations, and jobs (Bielby & Baron, 1986; 
Reskin, 1993; Reskin, McBrier, & Kmec, 1999). Gender segregation in the 
workplace is an important mechanism of gender inequality in the labor market 
because it channels men and women into different reward systems (Reskin, 1993). 
In particular, segregation across organizations influences both individuals and 
organizations; since organizational demography determines the type of social 
interactions in the workplace, it affects many outcomes such as individual-level 
turnover, job performance, and organization-level hiring practices and performance 
(Chen & Rider, 2016; Reskin et al., 1999). 
Here I empirically examine the level of gender segregation before and after 
the deregulation. Following Chen & Rider (2016), I measure the level of gender 
segregation as follows. For each individual founder in the sample, I compute the 
percentage of female co-founders that the focal individual has in his or her founding 
team. I then average the percentage of female co-founders for all females (") and 
for all males $ 	for before and after the deregulation, respectively. The level of 
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gender segregation for before and after the deregulation is measured by the gender 
difference as follows: 
 
&'()*+,) = "()*+,) − $()*+,) and  &'/*0), = "/*0), − $/*0), 
 
This measure indicates the extent to which female founders are more likely than male 
founders to have other female co-founders in their founding team. A higher value 
indicates that men and women are more segregated at the field level. 
Figure 2 compares the extent of gender segregation before and after the 
deregulation on founding team size. Before the deregulation, for female founders 
13.3% of their co-founders were female, while for male founders this percentage was 
6.4%, leading to a 6.9 percentage point difference. After the deregulation, however, 
this measure of gender segregation increased to 8.9 percentage points. In other words, 






FIGURE 2. Gender Segregation among Founding Teams: 
Before vs. After the Deregulation 
 
The level of gender segregation is measured by the difference between females’ and males’ 
average percentage of female co-founders in one’s founding team. This indicates the extent 
to which female founders are more likely than male founders to have other female co-
founders in their team. A higher value indicates that men and women are more segregated 
across founding teams. The figure above suggests that the level of gender segregation 
increased from 6.9 percentage points to 8.9 percentage points following the deregulation. 
 
 
An implication is that the deregulation on founding team size, which originally 
intended to facilitate entrepreneurship, unintentionally increases field-level gender 
segregation. This follows Chen & Rider's (2016) finding that new venture founding 
is linked to workforce segregation at the community level, as new ventures tend to 





Overall, the findings suggest that founding team demographic homogeneity has 
mostly increased following the relaxation of required team size. I suggest the 
mechanism of sequential homophily, where founders first exhaust homophilous ties 
and increasingly rely on dissimilar others as more members need to be recruited. 
Thus, team homogeneity is larger when the minimum required team size is smaller. 
Also, the data shows that increased team-level gender homogeneity leads to a higher 
level of field-level gender segregation. 
Furthermore, this increased homogeneity, along with the negative 
correlation between female and human capital characteristics at the field level, led 
to different results for men and women founders. While the overall quality of co-
founders deteriorated for both men and women after the deregulation, this decrease 
was particularly larger for women founders. Thus, because gender is aligned with 
major human capital attributes, female founders were more disadvantaged from the 
deregulation than male founders. 
The performance implication of this gender difference is not empirically 
tested in this paper, yet can be implied by the importance of the studied human capital 
attributes in the empirical context of the Korean legal industry. The three dimensions 
– elite educational background, prior judicial experience, and industry tenure – are 
all prominent quality signals that law firm clients rely on. This reliance comes from 
the high uncertainty about the quality of legal services and the information 
asymmetry between legal professionals and their clients, who are mainly individuals 
and small businesses for small law firms as in this study. Since it is hard to gauge the 
quality of legal services, clients often depend on quality markers such as educational 
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background. Moreover, prior judicial experience as a judge or prosecutor is a very 
important criterion of a lawyer in the Korean context. Former judicial officers are 
allegedly given favorable treatment by their former colleagues on the bench and in 
the prosecution, which has even led to a recent ban on former judges from working 
as private attorneys in their former jurisdictions for a year after retirement (Koo & 
Kim, 2011). Whether former judicial officers actually have such an advantage is a 
controversial issue, but it is undeniable that personal clients looking to hire a lawyer 
often rely on lawyers’ prior judicial experience to gauge their probability of winning 
a lawsuit. 
 This study makes several contributions to prior organizational literature. 
First, it contributes to the literature on the gender gap in entrepreneurship. While 
prior studies have largely examined the antecedents of female entrepreneurial entry 
and the outcomes of women’s ventures, I shed light on the process of recruiting co-
founders, which can be seen as a step in between one’s decision to become an 
entrepreneur and one’s success as an entrepreneur. Thus, I present the quality of 
founding teams as a source of gender gap among entrepreneurs. More specifically, I 
propose homophily among co-founders as an origin of initial gender differences in 
entrepreneurial quality. Given the long-lasting impact of founding teams on firm 
performance, the discussion on founding team composition can have broader 
implications to gender differences in entrepreneurial success. 
 Second, the findings contribute to sociological research on social networks 
by showing the sequential aspect of homophily. Using the deregulation on team size, 
I demonstrate that the formation of co-founding ties may follow an order in which 
founders first recruit most similar others, and then sequentially recruit more 
dissimilar others. Although the actual sequence of recruitment is unobservable in the 
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data, the higher team homogeneity when a smaller number of co-founders are 
required implies such a sequence. Another contribution comes from the study’s 
attention to field-level constraints resulting from the correlation among demographic 
characteristics. This multiform homogeneity (Blau, 1977; Reagans et al., 2004) at 
the higher level intrinsically bounds the possible combinations of team demography 
along consolidated dimensions. Therefore, future studies on homophily and tie 
formation should consider how different demographic characteristics overlap with 
each other at the population level. 
 Third, this study has policy implications that can be drawn from the 
unintended consequence of the deregulation. The results suggest that the 
deregulation on founding team size disadvantaged women compared to men in the 
process of finding co-founders. Although the institutional change intended to 
facilitate entrepreneurship and enhance market competition, it unintentionally 
resulted in relative disadvantage of an already disadvantaged minority group, namely 
women lawyers. While pro-competition policies are assumed to maximize efficiency 
from a neoclassical economics perspective, they may also bring unintended 
consequences because social actors are bound to preexisting social networks in 
which they are embedded (Granovetter, 1985). In other words, market-oriented 
deregulation that enables actors to freely choose fewer partners can result in 
increased embeddedness and homophily in the choice of partners. While 
embeddedness may benefit an individual or organization in their economic action, it 
may at the same time perpetuate preexisting socioeconomic inequalities. Thus, 
organizational research should pay attention to how individual- or firm-level 
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경영학과 경영학 전공 
오주현 
 
노동시장에서의 성 불평등에 대한 많은 기존 연구들이 기성 조직을 
대상으로 한 반면, 최근에는 신생 조직을 대상으로 여성 창업의 
선행요인과 그 결과에 대한 연구가 늘어나고 있다. 그러나 창업을 여성 
혹은 남성이 혼자하는 경우는 드물며, 창업자가 누구와 창업팀을 
구성하는가는 그의 성공을 좌우하는 중요한 요인이다. 따라서 본 연구는 
신생 조직에서 성 불평등이 야기되는 하나의 요소로 창업팀의 인적 
구성을 살펴본다. 본 연구는 국내 법무법인의 설립요건이 완화되기 
이전과 이후를 비교하여 법무법인 최소 구성원 수에 대한 규제 완화가 
창업팀 내의 동질성을 증가시켰음을 보인다. 이는 창업자가 자신과 좀더 
동질적인 공동창업자부터 우선적으로 영입하는 유유상종의 순차적 
특성(sequential homophily)에 기인한 것으로 분석한다. 특히 창업팀 내 
성별 동질성의 증가는 결과적으로 전체 설립자들 간의 성별 분리(gender 
segregation)를 심화시켰음을 보인다. 또한 본 연구는 국내 법률산업 
종사자들의 성별과 주요 인적자원 특성(출신대학, 경력년수, 판검사 경험 
등) 간의 밀접한 연관성으로 인해 규제 완화 이후 여성이 남성에 비해 
공동창업자들의 인적자본 수준에서 더 큰 감소세를 겪었음을 보인다. 
실증 분석에는 2005년부터 2014년까지 국내에 설립된 586개 법무법인과 
2,572명의 설립 변호사에 대한 데이터를 활용하였다. 
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